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Abstract—Heterogeneous wireless networks with small-cell
deployments in licensed and unlicensed spectrum bands are
a promising approach for expanding wireless connectivity and
service. As a result, wireless service providers (SPs) are adding
small-cells to augment their existing macro-cell deployments. This
added flexibility complicates network management, in particular,
service pricing and spectrum allocations across macro- and small-
cells. Further, these decisions depend on the degree of competition
among SPs. Restrictions on shared spectrum access imposed by
regulators, such as low power constraints that lead to small-cell
deployments, along with the investment cost needed to add small
cells to an existing network, also impact strategic decisions and
market efficiency. If the revenue generated by small-cells does
not cover the investment cost, then there will be no deployment
even if it increases social welfare. We study the implications
of such spectrum constraints and investment costs on resource
allocation and pricing decisions by competitive SPs, along with
the associated social welfare. Our results show that while the
optimal resource allocation taking constraints and investment
into account can be uniquely determined, adding those features
with strategic SPs can have a substantial effect on the equilibrium
market structure.
Index Terms—HetNets, pricing, bandwidth allocation, invest-
ment, spectrum regulations
I. INTRODUCTION
It is generally expected that current cellular networks will
continue to evolve towards heterogeneous networks (HetNets)
to accommodate the explosive demand for wireless data [3],
[4]. This will require service providers (SPs) to increas-
ingly deploy small-cells in addition to traditional macro-cells.
Macro-cells, which typically have large transmission power,
are capable of covering users within a large region. In contrast,
small-cells have much lower transmission power and are used
to provide service to a local area.
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While the deployment of small-cells will increase overall
data capacity, it also makes the network management and
resource allocation more complex for SPs that are (competi-
tively) operating their HetNets. This includes price differentia-
tion and optimal splitting of their limited bandwidth resources
between macro- and small-cells. These decisions must also
take into account the fact that users in the network are also
heterogeneous, in terms of their mobility. In this paper, we
study such issues and in particular we concentrate on two
important factors that can impact these decisions: small-cell
spectrum restrictions and investment choices. By “spectrum
restrictions”, we are refering to restrictions that certain bands
of spectrum can only be used for small-cell deployment.
This is motivated by the FCC policy for the new Citizens
Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) in the 3550-3650 MHz band
(3.5GHz Band) [5]. Restricting usage of this band to small-
cells, enables stricter power regulations, which in turn helps
facilitate sharing the band with existing incumbent users. Such
restrictions will clearly impact a SP’s network management
decisions both within the restricted band and in other bands.
The amount of small-cells deployed also will depend on the
investment decisions made by SPs for deploying this new
infrastructure. In a competitive environment, these decisions
will be coupled among different SPs and will also depend on
the SPs existing sunk investment in macro-cells.
Our approach in this paper builds on prior work in [6], [7]
that developed a model for studying pricing and bandwidth
allocation decisions among competitive SPs in HetNets. In
this model, users decide on the rate to request from a SP by
maximizing the difference between the utility they receive and
the cost of service. A key result in [6], [7] is that for the class
of α-fair utility functions, the Nash equilibrium achieved by
revenue optimizing SPs achieves the optimal social welfare.
This prior work did not consider bandwidth restrictions or
investment decisions, i.e., SPs could use their bandwidth for
either small- or macro-cells and any investment infrastructure
was assumed to already be sunk. Here, we consider both of
these effects which results in non-trivial generalizations of the
work in [6], [7] and leads to significantly different conclusions.
For example, we show that either of these considerations can
lead to a loss in social welfare with α-fair utilities. We analyze
both a single monopolist SP and a competitive scenario with
multiple SPs.
We first study the influence of spectrum restrictions. Here
we assume the SPs have the same predetermined infrastructure
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2deployment densities and can’t change these by investing in
additional infrastructure. The spectrum restriction considered
is such that each SP has a minimum amount of bandwidth that
can only be allocated to small-cells. Then we pivot to studying
the impact of investment and assume the SPs can partition the
bandwidth freely, subject to no restrictions. However, there
is a per unit deployment cost of small-cells, modeling the
investment needed by the SPs. In contrast, we assume that
any investment in macro-cells has already been sunk. In both
of these cases we characterize the SPs optimal bandwidth
partition between small- and macro-cells and their optimal
pricing decisions. Finally, we evaluate the impact of the two
factors on the social welfare achieved.
A. Contributions
We now summarize our primary contributions in this paper:
1. Incorporating spectrum restrictions or small-cell invest-
ment into the HetNet Model: As noted prior related work
did not incorporate either of these concerns. Here, we give
a models that incorporate each consideration.
2. Characterizing the impact of spectrum restrictions and
investment costs for SPs: We analyze scenarios with both a
monopoly SP and competitive SPs, and illustrate the impacts
brought by introducing spectrum restrictions and the invest-
ment in small-cells. We show that with small-cell spectrum
restrictions, a monopolist SP will simply increases its small-
cell bandwidth to the required minimum amount if its small-
cell bandwidth without restrictions is less than the constraint.
This applies to both social welfare and revenue-maximization.
With two competitive SPs, there always exists a unique Nash
equilibrium that depends on the spectrum restriction. We
illustrate this by considering three cases corresponding to
whether the equilibrium allocation without restrictions satisfies
the two constraints. We characterize the equilibrium for each
case. In contrast, with investment costs, the monopoly SP
only invests in small-cells if the per unit deployment cost for
small-cells is below a threshold. In a competitive scenario,
since a general analysis appears to be difficult, we focus on
a simplified model with two SPs and a binary investment
choice in which the small-cell deployment density is fixed.
We show that depending on the associated deployment costs,
different types of Nash equilibrium are possible corresponding
to different scenarios where one, none, or both SPs invest.
3. Social Welfare Analysis: We characterize the social wel-
fare for both spectrum constraints and investment costs. For
spectrum constraints, we show that if the equilibrium without
constraints violates the constraints, then social welfare loss is
inevitable. However, the social welfare loss is always bounded,
and the worst case happens when the spectrum regulator
requires the SPs to allocate all bandwidth only to small-cells.
With investment, we show that a monopoly SP, if it does invest
in small-cells, should deploy a higher density of small-cells to
maximize welfare than when maximizing revenue. For two
competitive SPs with a binary investment choice, again we
show that the Nash equilibria may not be socially optimal.
B. Related Work
Pricing and bandwidth allocation problems in HetNets have
attracted considerable attention. In [8]–[10], small-cell service
is considered as an enhancement to macro-cell service . In
contrast, [11]–[13] consider macro-cell and small-cell service
as separate services, the same as in this paper. Only optimal
pricing is studied in [8], [10], [14], [15], while [7], [9], [11]–
[13], [16] consider joint pricing and bandwidth allocation,
as in this paper. Additionally, except for [7], [14]–[16] that
include competitive scenarios with multiple SPs, all the other
work assumes only one SP. In this paper, we investigate both
monopoly and competitive scenarios.
The spectrum regulations in the 3.5GHz band have attracted
some attention in the research literature, and are seen as a
great opportunity for small-cell networks which could enhance
existing macro-cell service [17]. However, most of the existing
work focuses on the technical challenges of deploying small-
cells in the 3.5 GHz band, such as path loss validation [18],
or how to cope with the interference coming from shipborne
radar systems [19], [20]. None of the preceding work has
looked at how this band will impact bandwidth allocation and
pricing in other bands as we do here. Investment costs have
largely been neglected in the preceeding work on HetNets.
In [13] femtocell operational cost is considered and it is
linear with femtocell bandwidth. In contrast, [21], [22] take
both deployment cost and operational cost into account and
conduct an economic analysis with case studies or simulations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present
the system model in Section II. We consider the impacts on
small-cell resource allocation brought by introducing spectrum
restrictions and small-cell investment cost separately in Sec-
tion III and Section IV, respectively. Social welfare analysis
is in Section V. We conclude in Section VI. Due to space
considerations, all proofs of the main results can be found in
the appendix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We adopt a similar mathematical model as in our previous
work [6], [7] for the analysis. Fig. 1 illustrates the network
and market model. We now describe the different aspects of
it while pointing out the additional elements considered here.
A. SPs
We consider a HetNet with N SPs providing separate
macro- and small-cell service to all users. Denote the set
of SPs as N . Each SP operates a two-tier cellular network
consisting of macro-cells and small-cells, which are assigned
different licensed bands and are deployed uniformly over
a given area. We assume all SPs have the same macro-
cell infrastructure density, normalized to one. In contrast, the
deployment density of small-cells of SP i, is denoted as λi,S .
In our setting, macro-cells have high transmission power, and
therefore can provide large coverage range. In contrast, small-
cells have low transmission power, and consequently local
coverage range.
3Each SP i has a total amount of bandwidth Bi exclusively
licensed.1 Since we assume all macro- and small-cells use
separate bands, each SP i needs to decide how to split its
bandwidth into Bi,M , bandwidth allocated to macro-cells, and
Bi,S , bandwidth allocated to small-cells. When determining
this partition, every SP is required to conform to (possible)
bandwidth regulations enforced by the spectrum regulator.
Specifically, SP i is requested to guarantee a minimum amount
of bandwidth allocated to small-cells, and this lower bound is
denoted as B0i,S .
We assume that macro- and small-cells use the same trans-
mission technology, and so have the same (average) spectral
efficiency R02. Each SP i has a total bandwidth Bi, which
is split into Bi,M and Bi,S , the bandwidths allocated to
macro- and small-cells, respectively. Therefore, for a fixed
bandwidth allocation, the total available rates provided by the
macro- and small-cells for SP i are Ci,M = Bi,MR0 and
Ci,S = λi,SBi,SR0, respectively. Of course, in practice, the
spectral efficiency might vary with the particular spectrum
used as well. We ignore such effect here. Each SP i provides
separate macro- and small-cell services and charges the users
a price per unit rate for associating with its macro-cells or
small-cells, namely, pi,M and pi,S .
B. Users
We assume the users in the networks are also heterogeneous
and categorize them into two types based on their mobility
patterns. Mobile users can only be served by macro-cells. In
contrast, fixed users are relatively stationary, and can connect
to either macro- or small-cells (but not both). Denote the
densities of mobile users and fixed users as Nm and Nf ,
respectively. Note that the heterogeneity of the users can also
arise from an equivalent model that assumes (Nm + Nf ) as
the total density of users, who are mobile with probability
Nm/(Nm +Nf ) and stationary with probability Nf/(Nm +
Nf ). After user association, let Ki,M and Ki,S denote the
mass of users connected to the macro- and small-cells of SP
i, respectively. (Note that Ki,S consists of fixed users only,
whereas Ki,M can consist of both mobile and fixed users.)
C. Small-cell Spectrum Restrictions
In Section III, we consider small-cell spectrum restrictions.
These are modeled by restricting the bandwidth partition of
each SP to satisfy a specified minimum amount for small-
cells (representing the amount of restricted spectrum that SP
owns). Specifically, SP i is required to guarantee Bi,S ≥ B0i,s,
where B0i,S is the minimum small cell bandwidth. As indicated
in the introduction, this is primarily motivated by the case of
3.5 GHz band.
1For the monopoly SP scenario, we will ignore the subscript.
2Recent studies show that this may not be true, and the spectral efficiency in
small-cells may be 2-3x higher compared to macro-cells. In this case, we can
add another spectral efficiency gain factor λse in small-cells and the analysis
still applies.
Macro-cells
Pricing Decision :
Bandwidth Allocation :
Service Competition
Mobile 
Users
Fixed 
Users
Small-cells
SP 1 SP 2
Density: 1 Density:
Fig. 1. A depiction of our overall systems model when there are 2 SPs in
the market.
D. Small-cell Investment Costs
In Section IV, we study the impact of small-cell invest-
ment costs associated with deploying small-cell infrastructure,
modeled by a cost per unit density denoted by IS . That is, if
SP i wants to deploy and maintain a small-cell network with
λi,S density of small-cells, it has to pay an investment cost
of λi,SIS , which has to be taken into account when the SP
calculates its net operating revenue by providing both macro-
and small-cell service. In Section III, we assume that any such
costs are already sunk and the SPs simply have a given density
of small cells.
E. User and SP Optimization
We now introduce the optimization problems corresponding
to both users and SPs. We assume each user is endowed with
a utility function, u(r), which only depends on the service rate
it gets. For simplicity, we assume that all users have the same
α-fair utility functions [23] with α ∈ (0, 1):3
u(r) =
r1−α
1− α, α ∈ (0, 1). (1)
This restriction enables us to explicitly calculate many equilib-
rium quantities, which appears to be difficult for more general
classes of utility. Furthermore, this class is widely used in both
networking and economics, where it is a subset of the class
of iso-elastic utility functions.4
Each user chooses the service rate by maximizing its net
payoff W , defined as its utility less the service cost. For a
service with price p, this is equivalent to:
W = max
r≥0
u(r)− pr. (2)
3One future direction is to relax this constraint, and allow different users
to have different α-fair utility functions to create another user heterogeneity
aside from being mobile or fixed.
4In general α-fair utilities require that α ≥ 0 to ensure concavity; requiring
α > 0 ensures strict concavity but allows us to approach the linear case as
α→ 0. The restriction of α < 1 ensures that utility is non-negative so that a
user can always “opt out” and receive zero utility. Note also that as α→ 1,
we approach the log(·) (proportional fair) utility function.
4For α-fair utility functions, (2) has the unique solution:
r∗ = D(p) = (u′)−1(p) = (1/p)1/α, (3)
where D(p) here can be seen as the user’s rate demand
function. The maximum net payoff for a user is thus:
W ∗(p) = u(D(p))− pD(p) = α
1− αp
1− 1α . (4)
Recall, that fixed users can choose between any macro- or
small-cell service offered by any SP, while mobile users can
only choose the macro-cell service provided by a SP. However,
here, we assume mobile users have priority connecting to
macro-cells, which means macro-cells will only admit fixed
users after the service requests of all mobile users have been
addressed.
For the association rules, we adopt the same process de-
scribed in [7]. That is, users always choose the service with
lowest price and fill the corresponding capacity. If multiple ser-
vices have the same price, then the users are allocated across
them in proportion to the capacities. Once a particular service
capacity is exhausted, then the leftover demand continues to
fill the remaining service in the same fashion.
Each SP determines the bandwidth split and service prices
to maximize its revenue, which is the aggregate amount paid
by all users associating with their macro- and small-cells, less
possible investment cost. Meanwhile, with small-cell spectrum
restrictions, they also need to conform to the constraints on
small-cell bandwidth allocation.
Specifically, in Section III, where we study the regulatory
constraints on small-cell bandwidth allocation, we assume all
SPs have the same predetermined small-cell deployment den-
sity, denoted as λS . SP i thus solves the following optimization
problem:
maximize Si = pi,MKi,MD(pi,M ) + pi,SKi,SD(pi,S),
(5a)
subject to Bi,M +Bi,S ≤ Bi, Bi,M ≥ 0, Bi,S ≥ B0i,S ,
(5b)
Ki,MD(pi,M ) ≤ Ci,M ,Ki,SD(pi,S) ≤ Ci,S ,
(5c)
0 < pi,M , pi,S <∞. (5d)
In Section IV, where we consider investment costs (but no
spectrum restrictions), SP i solves the following optimization
problem:
maximize Si = Ki,Mpi,MD(pi,M ) +Ki,Spi,SD(pi,S)
− λi,SIS , (6a)
Bi,M , Bi,S ≥ 0, Bi,M +Bi,S ≤ Bi, (6b)
Ki,MD(pi,M ) ≤ Ci,M ,Ki,SD(pi,S) ≤ Ci,S ,
(6c)
0 ≤ pi,M , pi,S <∞, λi,S ≥ 0. (6d)
Alternatively, a social planner, such as the FCC, may seek to
allocate bandwidth and set prices to maximize social welfare,
which is the sum utility of all users, less possible investment
costs in small-cells. With spectrum restrictions, this is given
by:
maximize SW =
N∑
i=1
[Ki,Mu(D(pi,M )) +Ki,Su(D(pi,S))],
(7)
subject to the same constraints (5b), (5c) and (5d).
In contrast, with investment cost, this is equivalent to:
maximize SW =
N∑
i=1
[Ki,Mu(D(pi,M )) +Ki,Su(D(pi,S))
− λi,SIS ], (8)
subject to the same constraints (6b), (6c) and (6d).
F. Sequential Game and Backward Induction
We model the investment, bandwidth and price adjustments
of SPs in the network as a three-stage process:
1) The SPs determine their investment levels, i.e., their
small-cell deployment density.
2) Each SP i first determines its bandwidth allocation
Bi,M , Bi,S between macro-cells and small-cells. Denote
the aggregate bandwidth allocation profile as B.
3) Given B (assumed known to all SPs), the SPs announce
prices for both macro-cells and small-cells. The users
then associate with SPs according to the previous user
association rule.
This process is motivated by the expectation that in prac-
tice bandwidth allocation and investment take place over a
slower time-scale than price adjustments. Also, we assume
the bandwidth allocation happens on a faster time-scale than
the investment decision, which is reasonable if a SP can
dynamically change its bandwidth assignment after it has
deployed its small-cells. Moreover, changing the bandwidth
partition could conceivably involve reconfiguring equipment at
both base stations and handsets, and adjusting the placement
of access points along with transmission parameters in order
to keep the rate per cell fixed. Adjustment of prices would
not require these additional changes. As a result, we generally
assume price adjustment happens at a faster time-scale than
bandwidth allocations.5
We then do backward induction. That is, we first derive
the price equilibrium under a fixed bandwidth allocation. We
then characterize the bandwidth allocation equilibrium based
on the price equilibrium obtained. Finally, when small-cell
investment cost is considered in Section IV, we compute the
investment equilibrium. For the first two steps of computing
the price and bandwidth allocation equilibrium, we will apply
the results obtained in [6] and [7] to simplify the analysis.
5In some scenarios where the equipment is capable of operating over a
wide range of frequencies without big configuration adjustments, bandwidth
partition changes may also happen dynamically. If we assume the bandwidth
allocation happens at a faster-time scale than price adjustments, the analysis
would again use the sub-game perfect equilibrium concept, and also backward
induction (with order reversed) to determine equilibria. This is out of scope
of this paper.
5III. THE IMPACT OF SMALL-CELL SPECTRUM
RESTRICTIONS
In this section we investigate the impacts of regulatory
constraints on small-cell bandwidth allocation on the pricing
and spectrum allocation in HetNets, with the corresponding
optimization problem in (5). Note that in order to evaluate the
impacts of spectrum restrictions independently, and also for
simplicity of analysis, in this section we assume all SPs have
already made the investment in small-cells and deployed the
necessary infrastructures.6 Moreover, we further assume all
SPs have deployed the same density of small-cells, denoted
as λS . We first analyze the monopoly scenario with a single
SP and show that in the monopoly scenario the SP simply
increases its small-cell bandwidth to the required minimum
amount if its optimal small-cell bandwidth without restrictions
is less than the constraint. With two competitive SPs, and there
always exists a unique Nash equilibrium that depends on the
regulatory constraints. We illustrate this by considering three
cases corresponding to whether the equilibrium allocation
without regulatory restrictions satisfies the two constraints, and
characterize the equilibrium for each case.
A. Monopoly Scenario
We first study the bandwidth allocation when a single SP
is operating in the network. This is similar to the analysis
in our previous work [6], except here we have an additional
regulatory constraint that imposes a minimum bandwidth
allocation to small-cells. This added constraint will change
the optimal bandwidth allocation strategy for the monopoly
SP. In [6] it is concluded that for the set of α-fair utility
functions we use in this paper, the revenue-maximizing and
social welfare-maximizing bandwidth allocation turn out to
be the same. The following theorem states that the optimal
bandwidth allocations under both objectives are still the same,
but adding a large value for the bandwidth set aside for small-
cells changes the optimal bandwidth allocation.
Theorem 1: For a monopoly SP, the optimal revenue-
maximizing bandwidth allocation strategies are the same as
the welfare maximizing strategies and can be determined by
the following cases:
1. If B0S ≤ Nfλ
1/α−1
S
B
Nfλ
1/α−1
S
+Nm
, the optimal bandwidth allocation
remains the same as that without the regulatory constraint. In
this case it is given by:
BSWS = B
rev
S =
Nfλ
1/α−1
S B
Nfλ
1/α−1
S +Nm
, (9a)
BSWM = B
rev
M =
NmB
Nfλ
1/α−1
S +Nm
. (9b)
2. If B0S >
Nfλ
1/α−1
S
B
Nfλ
1/α−1
S
+Nm
, the optimal bandwidth allocation
is changed to:
BSWS = B
rev
S = B
0
S , B
SW
M = B
rev
M = B −B0S . (10)
6Otherwise it makes no sense to enforce the constraint that each SP has to
set aside a specific amount of bandwidth for small-cells.
Consequently there will be both a welfare and revenue loss if
this case applies.
In both cases the optimal macro- and small-service prices
are market-clearing prices, i.e., the prices that equalize the
total rate demand and the total rate supply in both cells. (See
Appendix A for proof.)
Theorem 1 states that if the original optimal bandwidth
allocation without the bandwidth restrictions already satisfies
the imposed constraint, then the SP just keeps the same
bandwidth allocation. If the original bandwidth allocation
violates the regulatory constraint, then the SP increases the
small-cell bandwidth to the required level. This is because
the added regulatory constraint does not change the concavity
of the revenue or social welfare function with respect to the
small-cell bandwidth, and further increasing the bandwidth
allocation to small-cells will only lead to more revenue loss.
B. Competitive Scenario
We now turn to the competitive scenario with two SPs,
each of which maximizes its individual revenue. Applying
the results from [7], the price equilibrium given any fixed
bandwidth allocation is always the market-clearing price. We
therefore focus on the bandwidth allocation Nash equilibrium.
Considering the case without the additional regulatory con-
straint, using the results from [7], there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium and the bandwidth allocations of two SPs at
equilibrium are given by:
BNE1,S =
Nfλ
1/α−1
S B1
Nfλ
1/α−1
S +Nm
, BNE1,M =
NmB1
Nfλ
1/α−1
S +Nm
,
(11a)
BNE2,S =
Nfλ
1/α−1
S B2
Nfλ
1/α−1
S +Nm
, BNE2,M =
NmB2
Nfλ
1/α−1
S +Nm
.
(11b)
With the additional regulatory constraints, we have the fol-
lowing theorem characterizing the corresponding Nash equi-
librium between two SPs.
Theorem 2: With two SPs, and a constraint on minimum
small-cell bandwidth, a unique Nash equilibrium exists. More-
over, the total bandwidth allocated to small-cells by the two
SPs is no less than that without the regulatory constraints. See
Appendix B for proof.)
Theorem 2 states that the existence and uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium is preserved after adding the regulatory
constraints. This can be proved using similar methods as
provided in [7], with some modifications. The last part of the
theorem is subtler than it appears. One may try to argue that
if any of the constraints is violated, that SP then needs to
increase its bandwidth allocation to small-cells. It would then
hold that the total bandwidth allocated to small-cells surely
increases. However, the logic does not carry through if only
one constraint is violated at the Nash equilibrium omitting the
constraint. In that case, the SP with violated constraint must
increase the bandwidth allocation to small-cells. However, the
other SP, whose equilibrium small-cell bandwidth allocation
without restrictions satisfies the constraint, may potentially
6decrease its bandwidth in small-cells in response to the in-
crease in bandwidth allocation of its competitor. In that case,
determining the change in total bandwidth requires a more
detailed analysis. Nonetheless, Theorem 2 indicates that even
here the total bandwidth in small-cells would not decrease. We
will present a specific example later.
Depending on whether the regulatory constraints are vio-
lated or not at the Nash equilibrium without the constraints,
there are three cases we need to cover independently. We will
see that, in each case, the Nash equilibrium behaves differently.
Case A: Both constraints are satisfied. The new Nash
equilibrium is the same as the Nash equilibrium without
restrictions.
Case B: Both constraints are violated. The Nash equilibrium
without restrictions is no longer valid. The following proposi-
tion characterizes the properties of the new Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1: In case B, the Nash equilibrium with regu-
latory constraints is one of the following types:
Type I: Both SPs increase their small-cell bandwidth al-
locations to exactly the required amount, i.e., B1,S =
B01,S , B2,S = B
0
2,S .
Type II: One SP increases its small-cell bandwidth exactly
to the required amount, while the other SP increases further
beyond the required amount, i.e., B1,S = B01,S , B2,S >
B02,S or B1,S > B
0
1,S , B2,S = B
0
2,S .
It is conceptually easy to characterize the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the first type of Nash equilibrium to
hold since at that equilibrium the marginal revenue increase
with respect to per unit of bandwidth increase in small-cells
should be non-positive for both SPs. This can be analytically
expressed via the two corresponding inequalities:
λSR
0
S
−α −R0M−α −
αλ2SB
0
i,SR0
Nf
R0S
−α−1
+
(Bi −B0i,S)R0
Nm
R0M
−α−1 ≤ 0, for i = 1, 2. (12)
Here, R0S and R
0
M are defined as follows:
R0S =
λS(B
0
1,S +B
0
2,S)R0
Nf
, (13a)
R0M =
(B1 −B01,S +B2 −B02,S)R0
Nm
. (13b)
Case C: Only one constraint is violated. Without loss
of generality, we assume at the Nash equilibrium without
restrictions, only SP 2’s small-cell bandwidth allocation falls
below the required threshold. In this case, the new Nash
equilibrium is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2: In case C, the Nash equilibrium with regu-
latory constraints is one of the following two types:
Type I: Both SPs allocate exactly the required minimum
amount of bandwidth to small-cells, i.e., B1,S = B01,S , B2,S =
B02,S .
Type II: Only SP 2 allocates exactly the required minimum
amount of bandwidth to small-cells, i.e., B1,S > B01,S , B2,S =
B02,S . (See Appendix C for proof.)
Note that equation (12) also gives conditions when a type
I equilibrium arises.
While the type I Nash equilibrium in both cases B and
C indicate both SPs allocate exactly the required minimum
amount to small-cells, they are quite different. In case B both
SPs increase their small-cell bandwidth allocations, whereas
in case C, one SP increases its small-cell bandwidth while
the other SP decreases its small-cell bandwidth. Another
difference is that in case C, the SP whose small-cell bandwidth
allocation without restrictions violates the constraint always
operates at exactly the required minimum point at the new
Nash equilibrium, while it will further increase its small-cell
bandwidth beyond the minimum point in a type II equilibrium
for case B.
Next we use a specific example in Fig. 2 to illustrate the
different Nash equilibrium regions as a function of the small-
cell bandwidth constraints discussed in the preceding cases.
The system parameters for this case are: α = 0.5, Nm = Nf =
50, R0 = 50, λS = 2, B1 = 2, B2 = 1. In this example the
original equilibrium small-cell bandwidth allocations without
the regulatory constraints are: B1,S = 1.34, B2,S = 0.67. Re-
gion A corresponds to the Nash equilibrium in case A, which is
also the equilibrium without the regulatory constraints. Region
B.I and Region B.II correspond to the type-I and type-II Nash
equilibrium in case B where both constraints are violated at
the original equilibrium, and the same rule applies to Region
C.I and C.II.
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Fig. 2. Nash equilibrium regions for 2 SPs as the bandwidth restrictions vary.
IV. THE IMPACT OF SMALL-CELL INVESTMENT COST
In this section we study the impacts of small-cell invest-
ment on pricing and spectrum allocation in HetNets, with
the corresponding optimization problem in (6). Note that in
this section we assume no spectrum restrictions are enforced,
and as a result SPs are free to split the bandwidth in an
arbitrary way. We first assume a single SP and characterize
the optimal investment strategy, as well as the corresponding
pricing and bandwidth partition across macro- and small-
cells. The deployment density largely depends on the per unit
deployment cost of small-cells. We then consider a binary
investment game in which each SP has the option of investing
7in a small-cell network with fixed deployment density, and
show that equilibria exist in which one, none, or both SPs
invest. In addition, there exists asymmetric equilibrium where
one SP invests in small-cells while the other doesn’t.
A. Monopoly Scenario
In this section we investigate optimal pricing, investment
and bandwidth allocation with a single SP, i.e., the monopoly
scenario. Here we assume the SP maximizes revenue, and
consider social welfare maximization Section V.
We first study the pricing decision and bandwidth allocation
given fixed investment in small-cells. Once the small-cell
deployment density is determined, the investment cost is fixed.
As a result, the revenue of the SP only varies with income, i.e.,
the aggregate amount paid by all users for choosing its macro-
or small-cell service. Therefore we can apply the optimal
pricing and bandwidth allocation results in our previous work
[6], [7]. We have two different service structures depending
on whether macro-cells serve fixed users or not:
1. Mixed service: Macro-cells serve both mobile users and a
subset of fixed users;
2. Separate service: Macro-cells only serve mobile users.
Of course, if λS = 0, then all available bandwidth is assigned
to macro-cells7.
Theorem 3: Given a fixed small-cell deployment den-
sity λS , the optimal prices and bandwidth allocation for a
monopoly SP is determined by the following cases:
1. If λS > 1, the optimal bandwidth allocation implies
separate service and is given by:
BrevS =
NfB
Nf +Nm
, BrevM =
NmB
Nf +Nm
(14)
where  = λ
1
α−1
S . Prices are then set to clear the market so
that all users are served and all rate is allocated:
prevS =
( λSBR0
Nf +Nm
)−α
, prevM =
( BR0
Nf +Nm
)−α
. (15)
2. If 0 ≤ λS ≤ 1, all bandwidth is allocated to macro-cells
and it corresponds to the mixed service scenario:
BrevS = 0, B
rev
M = B. (16)
The optimal prices are
prevS = 0, p
rev
M =
( BR0
Nf +Nm
)−α
. (17)
According to Theorem 3, the optimal prices and bandwidth
allocation are uniquely determined by the investment choice
and can be easily calculated. This will next be used to
determine the optimal investment.
From Theorem 3, we formulate the corresponding optimiza-
tion problem in the mixed service scenario as follows:
maximize
λS
S = BR0u
′( BR0
Nm +Nf
)− ISλS
subject to 0 ≤ λS ≤ 1.
7Here we drop the SP subscript i.
Since in this scenario all bandwidth is allocated to macro-
cells, the optimal small-cell deployment density should be
λS = 0. Similarly, when λS > 1, corresponding to the separate
service scenario, we have:
max
λS
S = BMR0u
′(BMR0
Nm
)
+ λSBSR0u
′(λSBSR0
Nf
)− ISλS
s. t. BS =
NfB
Nf +Nm
, BM =
NmB
Nf +Nm
, λS > 1. (18)
Solving this optimization problem gives the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 4 (Optimal Investment): The optimal small-cell
deployment density λrevS is the maximum of the following two
values:
λrevS = 0 or λ
rev
S = λ
∗
S (19)
where λ*S satisfies{
Nf (1− α)(BR0)1−αλ∗S
1
α−2(Nfλ∗S
1
α−1 +Nm)α−1 = IS
λ∗S > 1.
(P1)
(See Appendix D for proof.)
The first profile corresponds to the case that the SP does
not invest any amount in small-cells and consequently chooses
to allocate all bandwidth to macro-cells. The second profile,
however, indicates that the SP would deploy small-cells and
allocate some bandwidth in both macro- and small-cells. Note
that Theorem 4 indicates SPs either do not deploy small-
cells at all, or deploy the small-cells at a density greater than
macro-cells. This conclusion is therefore consistent with the
assumption λS > 1 in [6] and [7].
Depending on the values of α and other system parameters,
(P1) may have no solution. In this case the optimal investment
choice is λS = 0. The following proposition gives sufficient
conditions for this to happen. Specifically, it illustrates that if
the per unit deployment cost IS is large enough, the SP should
not invest in small-cells.
Proposition 3 (Sufficient Conditions for No Investment):
If the per unit deployment cost IS exceeds a threshold, (P1)
has no feasible solution and therefore the SP should not invest
in small-cells.
1. When α ∈ [α0, 1), the threshold is given by:
IS ≥ Nf (1− α)(BR0)1−α(Nf +Nm)α−1 (20)
where α0 is the unique solution to the following equation:
(Nf +Nm)(1− 2α) = Nf (1− α)2. (21)
2. When α ∈ (0, α0), the threshold is given by:
IS ≥ Nf (λ0S)
1−2α
α (1− α)(BR0)1−α(Nf (λ0S)
1−α
α +Nm)
α−1
(22)
where λ0S is the unique solution to the following equation:(
Nf +Nm(λ
0
S)
1− 1α )(1− 2α) = Nf (1− α)2. (23)
(See Appendix E for proof.)
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. The income
of the SP and the deployment cost both increase with the
deployment density of small-cells λS when λS > 1. However,
8if the marginal increase of income with respect to per unit
increase of λS is always smaller than that of investment
cost, it would never be beneficial to deploy small-cells for
the SP. The investment cost grows linearly with deployment
density λS . When α ∈ (α0, 1), the SP’s income is a concave
increasing function in λS . When α ∈ (α0, 1), the income first
increases convexly in λS . As λS further grows, it becomes a
concave function in λS again. Therefore there exists a certain
threshold above which deploying small-cells with λS > 1 is
never beneficial. Moreover, IS needs to be larger to make the
investment in small-cells less attractive.
Fig. 3 illustrates the optimal deployment density of small-
cells with the increase of per unit deployment cost. The pa-
rameters used are: R0 = 50, Nm = 50, Nf = 100, B = 1. We
can see that as IS increases, the optimal deployment density
of small-cells monotonically decreases until after a certain
threshold it reaches zero. Using equations (20) and (22), we
can calculate the sufficient conditions for no investment in
small-cells to be α = 0.5, IS ≥ 28.87, α = 0.4, IS ≥ 31.04,
and α = 0.3, IS ≥ 33.74, respectively. Note that the figure
shows the actual deployent density goes to zero before these
conditions apply. This is because even though (P1) has a
feasible solution, this solution must be compared with the no
investment choice to see which one generates more revenue.
Additionally note that smaller values of α result in larger
deployment densities of small-cells and so require larger
deployment costs before the denisty goes to zero.
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Fig. 3. Optimal deployment density of small-cells with different per unit
deployment cost for a monopoly SP.
B. Competitive Scenario
We now turn to the competitive scenario with more than
one SP. In the monopoly scenario, we considered that the
investment decision, λS , was a continuously valued. However,
the analysis with this assumption is much harder for the
competitive scenario. The primary challenge is that given fixed
and continuous investment choices by different SPs, although
the price equilibrium remains the same, i.e., SPs should always
set the market clearing price, it’s very difficult to derive the
bandwidth allocation equilibrium analytically. In most cases
we can only compute the bandwidth allocation equilibrium
numerically, which makes it difficult to get analytical insights
into the investment stage. To avoid this difficulty, we simplify
the model by making the investment choice of each SP binary,
i.e., we assume that each SP can either invest or not in small
cells at a given, fixed deployment density, λ0. That is, the SPs
can only choose between λS = 0 and λS = λ0; we refer to
this as a binary investment game. From the previous section
we see that if λS ≤ 1, the SP would allocate all bandwidth
to macro-cells since in this case small-cells generate less rate
while also incurring investment cost. Thus, we assume λ0 > 1
here. We further focus on a symmetric model, where each SP
has the same amount of bandwidth B.
For the binary investment game, we have four different
cases in terms of investment choices. We next characterize the
best response strategies of the two SPs and the corresponding
revenue achieved in each case. (See Appendix F for proof.)
1. If both SPs choose to invest in small-cells with deployment
density λ0. Using the results in our previous work [7], both SPs
would have the same bandwidth allocation between macro-
and small-cells and the corresponding revenues are given by:
B1,S = B2,S =
0NfB
0Nf +Nm
, (24)
B1,M = B2,M =
NmB
0Nf +Nm
, (25)
S1 = S2 = 2
−α(BR0)1−α(0Nf +Nm)α − λ0IS (26)
where 0 = λ
1
α−1
0 .
2. If neither SP invests in small-cells, then the case becomes
trivial. The revenue is given by:
S1 = S2 = 2
−α(BR0)1−α(Nm +Nf )α (27)
3. If SP 1 invests in small-cells while SP 2 doesn’t, the
bandwidth allocation of SP 1 and the corresponding revenue
achieved by two SPs are as follows:
1) If Nf > λ0Nm,
B1,S = min(B
rev
1,S , B), B1,M = B −B1,S (28)
S1 =λ0B1,SR0
(λ0B1,SR0
Nf
)−α
+
B1,MR0
( (B +B1,M )R0
Nm
)−α
− λ0IS (29)
S2 =BR0
( (B +B1,M )R0
Nm
)−α
(30)
where Brev1,S is the solution to the following equation:( (2B −Brev1,S)R0
Nm
)−α
+
αBR0
(1− α)Nm
( (2B −Brev1,S)R0
Nm
)−α−1
(31)
= λ0
(λ0Brev1,SR0
Nf
)−α
(32)
2) If Nf ≤ λ0Nm,
B1,S = B,B1,M = 0 (33)
S1 = λ0BR0
( (λ0 + 1)BR0
Nm +Nf
)−α
− λ0IS
9S2 = BR0
( (λ0 + 1)BR0
Nm +Nf
)−α
(34)
4. Due to symmetry, the case that SP 2 invests in small-cells
while SP 1 doesn’t is exactly the same as Case 3.
We next use a specific example to illustrate the analysis
described above. The parameters we use are: α = 0.7, R0 =
50, Nm = 40, Nf = 100, B = 1, λ0 = 2. Fig. 4 shows the
revenue achieved by two SPs for the binary investment game
when we vary the per-unit deployment cost.
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Fig. 4. Revenue achieved for two revenue-maximizing SPs in the binary
investment game.
We divide the figure into three regions and it’s easy to verify
that in Region 1 where the per unit deployment cost is very
small, the case that both SPs invest is a Nash equilibrium. In
contrast, one SP investing while the other doesn’t becomes
a Nash equilibrium in Region 2, where the deployment cost
is medium. In Region 3, where the deployment cost is very
large, the Nash equilibrium is that neither SP invests. This
numerical example shows that even for the simple binary
investment game, all four investment cases are possible Nash
equilibriums, depending on the specific parameters we choose.
In our previous work [7], we showed that if two SPs
are symmetric, i.e., if they have the same total amount of
bandwidth, at Nash equilibrium their strategies must also
be the same. However, when we consider investment, it is
possible to have an asymmetric Nash equilibrium even for
two symmetric SPs.
V. SOCIAL WELFARE ANALYSIS
We conduct social welfare analysis in this section, with the
intent to evaluate the impact of small-cell spectrum restrictions
and investment costs, respectively. In [6] [7], it was shown
that for the set of α-fair utility functions we use here, the
bandwidth allocation at equilibrium is always socially optimal
in both monopoly and competitive scenarios. However, the in-
troduction of regulatory bandwidth constraints or deployment
cost will change this behavior, and impact the social welfare
in a different way.
A. Social Welfare with Small-Cell Spectrum Restrictions
We start by considering the social welfare problem with
spectrum restrictions in (7). With a monopoly SP, it is easy to
show that the optimal social welfare-maximizing bandwidth
allocation strategy is the same as the revenue-maximizing
case given in Theorem 1.
With two competing SPs, in [6] [7], we showed that for
the set of α-fair utility functions we use here, the bandwidth
allocation at equilibrium is always socially optimal in both
monopoly and competitive scenarios. With the additional
regulatory constraints on the minimum amount of small-cell
bandwidth allocations, this is not necessarily true. Obviously,
if the equilibrium without restrictions already satisfies the
regulatory constraints, then the preceding result still holds, i.e.,
in case A in the previous section. Otherwise, a social welfare
loss is incurred compared to the case without regulatory
constraints. Denote SW∗wo,SW
NE
w as the equilibrium social
welfare without and with regulatory constraints, respectively.
The following theorem states that the loss in social welfare
is lower bounded, and the worst point occurs at the scenario
where the regulatory constraints require both SPs to allocate
all bandwidth only to small-cells.
Theorem 5: Compared to the case without the regulatory
constraints, social welfare loss is incurred when the following
inequality holds:
Nfλ
1/α−1
S
Nfλ
1/α−1
S +Nm
∑
i∈N
Bi <
∑
i∈N
B0i,S . (35)
We have:
SWNEw
SW∗wo
≥
( Nfλ1/α−1S
Nfλ
1/α−1
S +Nm
)α
, (36)
where the bound is tight exactly when B0i,S = Bi,∀i ∈ N .
(See Appendix G for proof.)
In practice, a spectrum regulator, such as the FCC, may seek
to find an optimal way to allocate newly available spectrum so
that the market equilibrium yields the largest social welfare.
We next use our results to analyze the case where the spectrum
regulator needs to allocate a total available new bandwidth B
to two competitive SPs. SP 1 and 2 each have initial licensed
bandwidth Bo1 and B
o
2 , and get a proportion of the new
bandwidth, denoted as Bn1 and B
n
2 . The initial bandwidth is
free to use for either macro-cells or small-cells. In contrast, the
new bandwidth can only be used for small-cells. As mentioned
before this is motivated by the 3.5GHz band, where FCC
regulates the power constraint to be very small, and therefore
it can only be used for small-cell deployment [5].
The spectrum regulator needs to determine the optimal split
of the new bandwidth such that the social welfare under market
equilibrium is maximized. We consider the following three
scenarios for any possible bandwidth partition (Bn1 , B
n
2 ):
1) The optimal social welfare without regulatory constraints,
SW∗wo. Note, from [7], this is the same as the equilibrium social
welfare without regulatory constraints. This will be used as a
benchmark.
2) The optimal social welfare with the regulatory con-
straints, which we denote as SW∗w.
3) The equilibrium social welfare with regulatory con-
straints, SWNEw .
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The next theorem compares the three scenarios depending
on the total amount of newly available bandwidth B.
Theorem 6: Given an amount of new bandwidth B, there
exists a bandwidth threshold T
T =
(Bo1 +B
o
2)Nfλ
1/α−1
S
Nm
, (37)
which determines the following relations:
1. If B > T , then SWNEw ≤ SW∗w < SW∗wo. The first inequality
is binding, i.e., SWNEw = SW
∗
w < SW
∗
wo, if and only if (12)
holds.
2. If B ≤ T , then SWNEw ≤ SW∗w = SW∗wo. The first inequality
is binding, i.e., SWNEw = SW
∗
w = SW
∗
wo, if and only if the
following condition is met:
Bn1 ∈
[
B − B
o
2Nfλ
1/α−1
S
Nm
,
Bo1Nfλ
1/α−1
S
Nm
]
, Bn2 = B −Bn1 .
(38)
(See Appendix H for proof.)
Theorem 6 states that if the total amount of newly available
bandwidth is too large, no matter if the two competing SPs
maximize revenue or social welfare, we always have some
social welfare loss compared to the case without regulatory
constraints. This can be explained as follows. Using the set
of α-fair utility functions, without regulatory constraints the
socially optimal bandwidth allocation strategy is to allocate
bandwidth to macro- and small-cells based on a fixed pro-
portion. If the total amount of newly available bandwidth is
not large, simply following the original allocation satisfies
the regulatory requirement and is therefore socially optimal.
However, when the amount of new bandwidth becomes large,
since the new bandwidth is required to be allocated to small-
cells only, the original optimal proportion would violate the
small-cell bandwidth constraints. As a result of this, social
welfare loss relative to the original allocation scheme becomes
inevitable. Further, note that the bandwidth threshold at which
this loss occurs is proportional to NfNm , so that when there
are more fixed users willing to use small-cells, the threshold
increases. It is also increasing in λS , the gain in spectral
efficiency of small-cells and in the initial allotment of licensed
bandwidth.
Theorem 6 also indicates that when the amount of newly
available bandwidth is below the threshold, there exists a
bandwidth split that achieves the optimal benchmark social
welfare. This result suggests that if a spectrum controller is
planning to enforce bandwidth restrictions on newly released
bands, it should consider the possible impacts on the market
equilibrium. In particular, if the amount of newly available
bandwidth is too large, imposing such restrictions might lead
to social welfare loss compared to the scenario where the
restrictions were not imposed. On the other hand, if the
amount of new spectrum is small compared to the existing
bands already licensed to SPs in the market, the influence on
the market equilibrium from the introduction of bandwidth
restrictions on the new bands is minor and controllable, and
therefore will not incur any loss in the social welfare.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate Theorem 6. The system parameters
we use in both cases are: α = 0.5, Nm = Nf = 50, R0 =
50, λS = 4, B
o
1 = 1, B
o
2 = 1.2. The Figures differ in the
amount of new bandwidth. In Fig. 5, B = 10, while in Fig. 6,
B = 6. We can see that when the amount of newly available
bandwidth is not large, there is a bandwidth split that achieves
the optimal benchmark social welfare. However, when the
amount of new bandwidth is large relative to the amount of
original bandwidth of the SPs, there exists no bandwidth split
that achieve the optimal social welfare without the constraints.
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B. Social Welfare with Small-Cell Investment Costs
In this subsection, we turn to the social welfare optimization
problem given in (8). Similarly, we start with the monopoly
scenario. After introducing the deployment cost of small-cells,
and changing the SP’s objective to maximizing social welfare,
the next theorem summarizes the properties of the optimal
investment, bandwidth allocation, and pricing.
Theorem 7: Given a social welfare maximizing SP, we have
the following properties:
1) The optimal pricing and bandwidth allocation strategy
under fixed deployment density is the same as that of revenue
maximization stated in Theorem 3.
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2) The optimal deployment density for small-cells is very sim-
ilar to that of revenue maximization except for an additional
factor of 11−α . It can only occur at one of the following two
sets of points:
λswS = 0 or λ
sw
S = λ
∗
S (39)
where λ∗S is the solution to the following equation:{
Nf (BR0)
1−αλ∗S
1
α−2(Nfλ∗S
1
α−1 +Nm)α−1 = IS ,
λ∗S > 1.
(P1)
For the same set of parameters, if both λswS > 1 and λ
rev
S > 1,
then λswS > λ
rev
S .
Theorem 7 shows that compared with revenue
maximization, if the SP operates in small-cells (when
λS > 0), social welfare maximization requires the SP to
make a larger investment in small-cells. This observation is
easily explained once we take a deeper look at the market
structure in our model. The social welfare is the sum utility
of all users minus the investment cost, while the revenue is
defined as the income of the SP less the investment cost.
In equation (4), u(D(p)) is the utility and pD(p) is the
revenue of the SP. For α-fair utility functions, we can easily
verify that pD(p) = (1 − α)U(D(p)). For both revenue
maximization and social welfare maximization we need to
subtract the same investment cost. However, with revenue
maximization the income part is only a fraction of the
sum utility. As a result, the marginal income increase with
respect to an increase in λS is always smaller than that of the
marginal utility increase, which leads to the result that revenue
maximization has a smaller deployment density in small-cells.
We next see the social welfare performance of different
Nash equilibria of the binary investment game introduced
in Section IV. Fig. 7 shows the social welfare achieved if
SPs perform revenue-maximizing strategies with the same
parameters as in Fig. 4. We can see that while that both
SPs investing in small-cells should be the Nash equilibrium
in Region 1, the social welfare achieved may be less than
that from the case only one SP invests. On the other hand, in
Region 3 the Nash equilibrium is that no SP invests in small-
cells, whereas the social welfare associated with the case that
only one SP invests is larger within a range of IS . From this
example we conclude that the Nash equilibria of the binary
investment game are not necessarily socially optimal. This is
significantly different from the result in [7] where the Nash
equilibria corresponding to α-fair utility functions with fixed
deployment density of small-cells are always socially optimal.
If we assume the SPs perform social welfare-maximizing
strategies, the bandwidth allocation when two SPs both invest
would be the same as revenue-maximizing SPs case [7].
Consequently, the social welfare would be the same when
either both SPs invest or neither SP invests. When only one
SP invests, the bandwidth allocation is different and it can be
proved that in this case social welfare-maximizing SPs would
allocate more bandwidth to small-cells compared to revenue-
maximizing SPs. Fig. 8 illustrates the social welfare achieved
if SPs use such strategies with the same setting as in Fig. 7.
Fig. 8 shows that the social welfare corresponding to the case
where only one SP invests is now larger.
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Fig. 7. Social welfare achieved for two revenue-maximizing SPs in the binary
investment game.
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Fig. 8. Social welfare achieved for two social welfare-maximizing SPs in the
binary investment game.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we considered the impact of spectrum re-
strictions and investment costs on the pricing and bandwidth
allocation decisions by both a monopolist and competitive SPs.
Moreover, we also evaluated the corresponding social welfare
implications of these factors.
By imposing a required minimum bandwidth allocation on
small-cells, the optimal bandwidth allocation strategies of SPs
can change dramatically from the unrestricted case. While this
change is relatively straightforward in the monopoly scenario,
it turns out to be much more complicated in the competi-
tive scenario with two SPs. Specifically, the existence and
uniqueness of Nash equilibria are still preserved after adding
these constraints. However, the equilibria can exhibit very
different structures and characteristics as the constraints vary.
We showed that the introduction of such spectrum constraints
may shift the equilibrium away from an efficient allocation,
thus incurring some social welfare loss.
In contrast, by considering the deployment cost of small-
cells, we showed that for a monopolist SP, the optimal
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deployment density of small-cells largely depends on the per
unit deployment cost. If the per unit deployment cost is large
enough, a revenue-oriented SP may decide not to deploy small-
cells. If social welfare is the objective, and if the SP does invest
in small-cells, then it will deploy a higher density of small-
cells than when maximizing revenue. With multiple SPs, we
considered a simplified binary investment game and showed
that different types of Nash equilibrium are possible as the unit
deployment cost varies. Depending on the investment cost, at
Nash equilibrium, the number of SPs that invest in small-cells
can be zero, one or two. However, the Nash equilibria may
not be socially optimal.
Our results show that both spectrum restrictions and invest-
ment costs can result in some welfare loss compared to the
case where they are absent. To avoid this loss, a regulator could
attempt to avoid restricting spectrum usage and try to lower
the investment costs in small cells. Of course, there will be
other considerations that regulators need to account for such as
the sharing constraints in the 3.5 GhZ band that may motivate
not adopting these suggestions.
For future directions, instead of studying small-cell spec-
trum restrictions and investment costs individually, one could
jointly consider these effects. Another possible direction is
to consider the addition of unlicensed spectrum in which
multiple providers could deploy small cells using techniques
such as WiFi, LTE-U, or LAA as in [16]. It would also be
useful to study the impact of other policy and operational
decisions, and also a broader set of applications and radio
access technologies.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward and we can apply
the results in [6] directly. In particular, if the original optimal
bandwidth allocation still holds with the added restriction con-
straints, then we are done. Otherwise we have to increase the
small-cell bandwidth allocation. Both the revenue and social
welfare are concave functions in the small-cell bandwidth
allocation, and at the original equilibrium point the marginal
revenue and social welfare increase with respect to per unit
increase in bandwidth are equal for both macro- and small-
cells. Hence, when the small-cell bandwidth increases, we
enter the region where the marginal revenue and social welfare
increase with respect to per unit increase in bandwidth for
small-cells is smaller than that of macro-cells. As a result, the
best option is to operate at the boundary point, i.e., allocating
exactly the required minimum amount of bandwidth to small-
cells.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
As this is a concave game, to prove the existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, we can use the uniqueness
theorem (Theorem 6) in Rosen’s paper [24], which gives
sufficient condition in terms of a certain matrix being negative
definite. In our previous work [7] it was proved that the
required matrix is negative definite for the corresponding game
without bandwidth restrictions. Here the only difference is
that we have additional linear constraints on the bandwidth
allocations, which do not have any effect on this result.
Therefore, the same arguments also apply here.
As for the second part of the theorem, denote RS and R′S
as the average service rate in small-cells with and without
the regulatory constraints, respectively. Suppose at the Nash
equilibrium with constraints, the sum bandwidth allocation to
small-cells is less than that without the regulatory constraints,
then we have:
R′S < RS . (40)
Denote Di = ∂Si∂Bi,S , it follows that:
D1 +D2 =λS
[
2u′(RS) +RSu′′(RS)
]
−[
2u′(RM ) +RMu′′(RM )
]
. (41)
Since 2u′(r) + ru′′(r) decreases in r, and we know that
at the Nash equilibrium without constraints, D1 = D2 = 0,
we can conclude that D1 + D2 > 0 at the equilibrium with
constraints. As a result, at least one of D1 or D2 must
be greater than 0 at equilibrium. Without loss of generality,
suppose D2 > 0 at the equilibrium with constraints.
Given D2 > 0 , it must be that B′2,S = B2, and D1 ≤ 0.
This is because if D1 > 0 also holds, B′1,S = B1 and it
contradicts with the fact that R′S < RS .
Then at the Nash equilibrium without constraints, we have:
D1 =λSu
′(RS) + λ2S
B1,SR0
Nf
u′′(RS)
− u′(RM )− B1,MR0
Nm
u′′(RM ) (42)
=λS
[
u′(RS) +RSu′′(RS)
]
−
[
u′(RM ) +RMu′′(RM )
]
− λ2S
B2,SR0
Nf
u′′(RS) +
B2,MR0
Nm
u′′(RM ) = 0. (43)
At the equilibrium with constraints, similarly we have:
D1 =λS
[
u′(R′S) +R
′
Su
′′(R′S)
]
−
[
u′(R′M ) +R
′
Mu
′′(R′M )
]
− λ2S
B2R0
Nf
u′′(R′S) ≤ 0. (44)
However, since u′(r) + ru′′(r) decreases in r, u′′(r) < 0
and increases in r, and the fact that R′S < RS , R
′
M > RM ,
the inequality sign in (44) should be reversed. Therefore we
have a contradiction.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We prove why it is not possible to have B1,S =
B01,S , B2,S > B
0
2,S at the NE of type II in case C.
If at the new NE with constraints, we have B1,S =
B01,S , B2,S > B
0
2,S . We must have D1 ≤ 0, D2 ≥ 0. For
the latter, we have:
D2 =λS
[
u′(R′S) +R
′
Su
′′(R′S)
]
−
[
u′(R′M ) +R
′
Mu
′′(R′M )
]
− λ2S
B1,SR0
Nf
u′′(R′S) +
B2,MR0
Nm
u′′(RM ) ≥ 0. (45)
Without constraints, we have D′1 = 0, D
′
2 = 0, and denote
the corresponding bandwidth allocation as (B′1,S , B
′
1,M ) and
(B′2,S , B
′
2,M ), we have:
D′2 =λS
[
u′(R′S) +R
′
Su
′′(R′S)
]
−
[
u′(R′M ) +R
′
Mu
′′(R′M )
]
− λ2S
B′1,SR0
Nf
u′′(R′S) +
B′2,MR0
Nm
u′′(RM ) = 0. (46)
However, since u′(r) + ru′′(r) decreases in r, u′′(r) < 0
and increases in r, along with the fact that B1,S ≤ B′1,S ,
B1,M ≥ B′1,M , RS > R′S , and RM < R′S , we can conclude
D2 < D
′
2 = 0. We therefore have a contradiction.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
When λS > 1, we can rewrite the revenue of the SP as
follows:
S = NmRMu
′(RM ) +NfRSu′(RS)− ISλS , (47)
where RM , RS are the average rate in macro- and small-cells,
respectively. By Theorem 3 we can calculate:
RM =
BR0
Nm + Nf
, RS =
λ
1
α
S BR0
Nm + Nf
. (48)
Hence we can express S as a function of λS and the
derivative with respect to λS is given by:
S = (BR0)
1−α(Nm + Nf )α − ISλS , (49)
∂S
∂λS
= Nf (1− α)(BR0)1−αλ
1
α−2
S (Nm + Nf )
α−1 − IS .
(50)
In order to find the maximal point, we can set the derivative
to zero and find the stationary points.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Calculating the second derivative of S with respect to λS ,
we have:
∂2S
∂λ2S
=Nf (1− α)(BR0)1−α
[1− 2α
α
(Nm + Nf )
α−1λ
1
α−3
S
− (1− α)
2
α
Nf (Nm + Nf )
α−2λ
2
α−4
S
]
. (51)
It’s easy to see if α ∈ ( 12 , 1), the second derivative is always
negative. As a result, S is concave with λS .
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Moreover, if α ∈ (0, 12 ) we do the following notation:
P =
1− 2α
α
(Nm + Nf )
α−1λ
1
α−3
S , (52)
N =
(1− α)2
α
Nf (Nm + Nf )
α−2λ
2
α−4
S . (53)
P and N denote the absolute value of the positive and
negative term in (51), respectively.
P
N
=
(1− 2α)(Nmλ1−
1
α
S +Nf )
(1− α)2Nf , (54)
which clearly decreases with λS . As a result, if PN is no more
than one when λS = 1, we can conclude that S is always
concave with λS . This is satisfied when:
(1− 2α)
(1− α)2 ≤
Nf
(Nm +Nf )
. (55)
Since the left hand side is decreasing with α, this condition
is simply α > α0 where α0 is the solution to:
(1− 2α)
(1− α)2 =
Nf
(Nm +Nf )
. (56)
When S is concave with λS , if the derivative is less than
zero at the initial point λS = 1, then we can conclude (P1)
has no solution and the SP should not invest in small-cells.
This condition is given by:
IS ≥ Nf (1− α)(BR0)1−α(Nf +Nm)α−1 (57)
When α ∈ (0, α0), it’s easy to see that when λS is small,
S is convex with λS and when λS is large, S is concave with
λS again. As a result, the maximum derivative occurs at the
turning point when PN = 1, i.e.,
1− 2α
(1− α)2 =
Nf
Nf +Nmλ0S
1− 1α
(58)
If the derivative at λS = λ0S is less than zero, then (P1) has
no solution and the SP should not invest in small-cells. This
condition is given by:
IS ≥ Nfλ0S
1
α−2(1− α)(BR0)1−α(Nfλ0S
1
α−1 +Nm)α−1
(59)
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF RESULTS ABOUT THE BINARY INVESTMENT
GAME IN SECTION IV
Since the cases that both SPs invest and neither SP invests
are trivial, we only prove the optimal bandwidth allocation
when only SP 1 invests.
The boundary point between mixed and separate service
scenario is RS = RM , i.e.,
(B+B1,M )R0
Nm
=
λ0B1,SR0
Nf
. Thus,
we can easily verify that if Nf ≤ λ0Nm, it would always be
mixed service scenario.
At mixed service scenario, the revenue of SP 1 is given by:
S1 =(B1,M + λ0B1,S)R0u
′
( (B +B1,M + λ0B1,S)R0
Nm +Nf
)
=R(Nm +Nf )u
′(R)− BR0
Nm +Nf
u′(R) (60)
where R is the average rate in both macro- and small-cells.
Since Ru′(R) is increasing with R while u′(R) is decreas-
ing with R, SP 1 would always have the incentive to increase
B1,S at mixed service scenario. When Nf ≤ λ0Nm, this
means B1,S = B. When Nf > λ0Nm, this means the optimal
would occur at separate service.
At separate service scenario, the revenue of SP 1 is given
by:
S1 = B1,MR0u
′
( (B +B1,M )R0
Nm
)
+λ0B1,SR0u
′
(λ0B1,SR0
Nf
)
(61)
Taking the derivative of S1 with respect to B1,M and B1,S ,
respectively, we have:
∂S1
∂B1,M
= R0
[
u′(RM ) +RMu′′(RM )− BR0
Nm
u′′(RM )
]
(62)
∂S1
∂B1,S
= (1− α)R0
[
u′(RS) +RSu′′(RS)
]
(63)
It’s easy to see S1 are both concave increasing with B1,M
and B1,S , therefore the optimal point should occur at the point
where the two marginal increases are equal. That is given by:( (2B −Brev1,S)R0
Nm
)−α
+
αBR0
(1− α)Nm
( (2B −Brev1,S)R0
Nm
)−α−1
= λ0
(λ0Brev1,SR0
Nf
)−α
(64)
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Applying the same arguments we used in proving Theorem
1, we know that since increasing the small-cell bandwidth
allocation beyond the original equilibrium point only decreases
the social welfare, then the worst case occurs at the point that
all bandwidth is required to be allocated to small-cells.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
For scenario 2) and 3), as long as the sum of the small-
cell bandwidth allocations of the two SPs at the equilibrium
without the constraints is larger than the sum of the restriction
constraints, then they are the same. This requires:
Nfλ
1/α−1
S (B
o
1 +B
n
1 +B
o
2 +B
n
2 )
Nfλ
1/α−1
S +Nm
≥ Bn1 +Bn2 , (65)
which yields the following condition:
B ≤ (B
o
1 +B
o
2)Nfλ
1/α−1
S
Nm
. (66)
Otherwise, if the preceding condition is not satisfied, the social
welfare corresponding to the second scenario is also less than
that corresponding to the first scenario, i.e., SW∗w < SW
∗
wo.
On the other hand, the only possible way for scenario 3) to
achieve the optimal social welfare corresponding to scenario
15
1) is to ensure the Nash equilibrium is exactly the same as the
one without the restriction constraints. This requires:
Nfλ
1/α−1
S (B
o
1 +B
n
1 )
Nfλ
1/α−1
S +Nm
≥ Bn1 ,
Nfλ
1/α−1
S (B
o
2 +B
n
2 )
Nfλ
1/α−1
S +Nm
≥ Bn2 ,
(67)
which can be simplified to:
B ≤ (B
o
1 +B
o
2)Nfλ
1/α−1
S
Nm
, (68a)
Bn1 ∈
[
B − B
o
2Nfλ
1/α−1
S
Nm
,
Bo1Nfλ
1/α−1
S
Nm
]
. (68b)
When SW∗w < SW
∗
wo, it means the required minimum sum
bandwidth allocation to small-cells is larger than the sum
bandwidth in small-cells at the equilibrium without constraints.
Since we know that at the original equilibrium the social
welfare is maximized and the social welfare is a concave
function with respect to the sum bandwidth in small-cells,
in this case the social welfare maximizing point with the
constraints is therefore exactly the required minimum small-
cell bandwidth point, i.e., when B1,S +B2,S = B01,S +B
0
2,S .
The only possibility for scenario 3) to achieve this is to ensure
B1,S = B
0
1,S , B2,S = B
0
2,S at the Nash equilibrium with
constraints. As a result, equation (12) becomes exactly the
condition for SWNEw = SW
∗
w.
